The debate about the war in Iraq was always really about this question:
what happens now. The Americans sometimes act as if they have proven the world wrong
by winning an easy victory. Nobody doubted the easy "victory"-- Iraq
has about 25 million people, the U.S., 300 million. But the Iraqis
are not, as a rule, dancing in the streets waving American flags, Donald Rumsveld
notwithstanding. They're not. A lot of them are saying, "thank you very
much, now get out." The first large demonstrations against the American
presence have already occurred.
These are the key elements of postwar Iraq.
1. The Kurds. There are about five million
Kurds in Iraq. More importantly, there are about 20 million Kurds in Turkey.
That's right-- that's the number that is more important. The Kurds have been
fighting Turkey and Iraq for about 30 years -- well, actually, about 800 years-- for a
Kurdish homeland. There are two leaders among the Kurds in Northern Iraq right now: Massoud
Barzani and Jalal Talabani. The Kurds have an army, the
"peshmerga".
2. Turkey: Turkey, as I mentioned, has about 20 million
Kurds. Those Kurds are like Quebecois-- they identify themselves strongly by their
ethnicity and they want a homeland. From about 1985 to 2000, 36,000 people
were killed in a brutal civil war in the area occupied by the Kurds in Southern
Turkey, between Marxist separatists led by Abdullah Ocalan, and the
Turkish government. I'll bet you don't remember that. Ocalan is now held in a
prison on an island called Imrali. After his imprisonment, Ocalan called for a
cease-fire but 5,000 of his fighters remain in Northern Iraq. Turkey has since generally
"repressed" the Kurds, and imposed a "State of Emergency" on the city
of Diyarbakir in Southern Turkey.
Turkey has two primary concerns. Firstly, it does not want another
deluge of refugees like it experienced during the first Gulf War, when 500,000 Kurds fled
Saddam's forces (while Bush Sr. stood by and did nothing). Secondly, it does not
want an independent Kurdish state to be established in Northern Iraq, and including the
oil-rich area of Kirkuk. Turkey has strongly indicated that it would deploy it's
forces in Northern Iraq to prevent such an occurrence. The Americans have cut a deal
here. They will stop the Kurds from taking control of Kirkuk or declaring a Kurdish
state, and Turkey will keep its troops within it's own borders.
About 90% of the population of Turkey-- and this includes the Kurds--
are against the American-led invasion of Iraq. The Kurds in Turkey are against it
because they believe the Turkish government will impose new restrictions upon them for
fear of incipient Kurdish nationalism coming to the fore in the post-war chaos.
It was reported in the New York Review of Books that after Turkey's
foreign minister Yashar Yakis, explained the complications of his
situation to President Bush, Bush told him, "I understand. Now go back to
Turkey and do the job." Yakis thought about this for a moment and then said,
"the man is ill."
3. The Shiites and "The
Surpreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq" (SCIRA). This
organization is headquartered in Iran(!) and headed by Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim.
It has links to Iran's radical Revolutionary Guard, which, of
course, is an arch-foe of the U.S. About 60% of Iraq's population is Shiite, as is
the large majority in Iran. After the first Gulf War, SCIRA led an uprising of
Shiites in the south of Iraq. The administration of Bush Sr., fearing that Iran
would become too powerful if it had a toe-hold in Iraq, allowed and even encouraged Saddam
to crush the revolt (General Schwarzkopf released seized helicopters and tanks to the
Iraqi forces to be used in the action).
Iran is not stupid. Though it officially opposes U.S. intervention
in Iraq, it is no friend of Saddam Hussein, who fought a bitter war against Iran in the
1970's and 80's, during which he employed chemical weapons, and was supported by the U.S..
Hussein was defeated only when Iran threw thousands of suicide fighters into
the fray, whose fanatical efforts turned the tide. So Iran, apparently, is quietly
encouraging Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim to be nice to the Americans, to ensure that he will
play a role in post-war Iraqi politics, and thereby be a conduit of Iranian influence.
Ahmed Chalabi is a protégé of the CIA, but is opposed
by the U.S. State Department. In other words, Colin Powell, ever aware (and probably
singularly aware) of long-term consequences, does not see him as an asset to post-war
reconstruction in Iraq. He has been out of the country for 45 years and may well be
perceived by Iraqis as a tool of the U.S. Chalabi keeps protesting that he has no
interest in a political role in post-war Iraq. Well, why the hell shouldn't he say
that? Is anyone going to tell President Chalabi to step down because he
once said he didn't want to be President?
4. OPEC - Will a postwar Iraq administration join
OPEC, which is, of course, an illegal oil cartel? If it doesn't, won't Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and other members have a fit-- the price of oil, with Iraq's huge reserves-- could
fall dramatically if Iraq competes with OPEC on the open market? Keep buying those
SUVs.
Those are the key elements, aside from the remnants of Saddam's regime,
a constituency of unknown character and composition.
There are a few possible outcomes of this entire enterprise, and it is
difficult to predict which one will prevail. The optimistic view is that all of
these groups, the Kurds, the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the remnants of Saddam's government
and civil service, will come together to form some kind of federation with a
constitutional government that respects minority rights while giving structure and
coherence to a democratic federal government.
Questions have to be answered.
Thomas Friedman, in the New York Times (April 15, 2003) says this: If
Lebanon, Iraq and a Palestinian state could all be made into functioning, decent,
free-market, self-governing societies, it would be enough to tilt the entire Arab world
onto a modernizing track.
Do you believe that? Doesn't that sound like
"pie-in-the-sky" nonsense? On what basis could you make a prediction like
that? How much more believable is it than a prediction that the surrounding Arab
states, terrified of possible U.S. intervention, simply accelerate their efforts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction and build up their armies, and crack down even more
brutally on dissent? What if Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are taken over by Islamic
fundamentalists and decide to curtail exports of oil to the west? The U.S. will
invade, of course. But then you will get an intifada in Iraq, requiring more U.S.
troops to suppress and maintain order. And you could have a hell of an intifada in
Saudi Arabia, with all those oil wells to blow up. Then Pakistan tilts the wrong
way, and India gets aggressive about Kashmir, and before you know it, you have a global
disaster.
Or... you could have a democratic, federated Iraq, with a
constitution that guarantees minority rights, equitable distribution of wealth, a free
press, labour unions, and other intermediary institutions. Democracies, as a rule,
don't threaten their neighbors, so Iran, if it no longer feels threatened, could chill out and de-accelerate it's drive to
acquire nuclear weapons. Mahmoud Abbas leads a democratic Palestinian leadership
into negotiations with Israel. Sharon, having proven his mojo with years of
hard-line tactics, feels free to make a deal and stops Israeli settlements in the disputed
territories and cedes back a good portion of the Golan Heights.
In short, peace breaks out. China and the U.S. cut a deal with
North Korea. The stock market revives. The Democrats win the White House in
2004 and pass legislation providing health care insurance for every American. Life
is great.
Crazier things have happened.
